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The political philosopher felix Oppenheim reconstructs a descriptive concept of 
“egalitarianism” on the basis of rules of distribution. The present paper reverses 
Oppenheim’s perspective by analyzing the role of distributives rules and of 
“egalitarianism” towards understanding distribution. in what measure does the concept 
of “egalitarianism” help us to understand distribution? is it possible to understand a 
distribution only on the basis of descriptive concepts?
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1.0. a peculiar category of rules, the rules of distribution, is analysed by the 
political philosopher felix oppenheim in (at least) three different essays: 
egalitarianism as a descriptive Concept (1970); egalitarian rules of distribution 
(1980) and in the 6th chapter of the book Political Concepts. a reconstruction 
(1981). In Oppenheim’s works three different definitions of “rule of 
distribution” appear.
1.1. First Definition. oppenheim introduces the concept of “rule of 
distribution” in the essay egalitarianism as a descriptive Concept. according to 
oppenheim, rules of distribution establish the distribution of burdens and 
benefits among the members of a group (defined by the rule). As stated by 
oppenheim:
“Rules of distribution have the general form: some specified benefit (e.g., 
franchise) or burden (e.g., a sales tax) is to be allocated or withheld from any 
person, depending on whether he has or lacks some specified characteristic 
(e.g., being a citizen over twenty-one, being white, buying cigarettes). or: the 
amount of some specified benefit (e.g., salary) or burden (e.g., income tax) to 
anyone shall be a function of the amount or degree to which he has a certain 
characteristic (e.g., his ability, his income)”1.
1.2. Second Definition. in the essay egalitarian rules of distribution, oppenheim 
develops the concept of “rule of distribution”. more precisely, oppenheim 
distinguishes the reference group (the class of people for whom the rule is meant) 
from the selected group (a subclass of the reference group to whom benefits or 
burdens are assigned) and he founds on the distinction between reference group 
and selected group the following new definition of rules of distribution:
“Such rules specify the following, either explicitly or implicitly: (i) a benefit 
(e.g., one vote) or a burden (e.g., one year’s military service) to be allotted; 
(ii) a reference group; that is, a class of persons to whom the rule is meant to 
apply, usually defined by a common characteristic (e.g., all citizens); (iii) a 
selected group; that is, a subclass of the reference group to whom the benefit 
or burden is to be allocated (e.g., all citizens of a certain age)”2.
1 (Oppenheim 1970, 144).
2 (Oppenheim 1980, 164); see also (Oppenheim 1981, 96-97).
RUles Of DIsTRIbUTION AND THe CONCePT Of “eGAlITARIANIsM” IN felIx 
OPPeNHeIM. TOWARDs UNDeRsTANDING DIsTRIbUTION
olimPia g. loddo università degli Studi di Cagliari
1. 
What is a Rule 
of Distribution? 
Three Definitions 
of Rule of 
Distribution
212
1.3. Third dDefinition. in the book Political Concepts. a reconstruction (1981), 
Oppenheim affirms that:
“[rules of distribution are] rules enjoining one actor to distribute a 
quantifiable benefit [...] or burden [...] to at least two other actors”3
In the following § 2. I will focus my analysis on the third definition of rule 
of distribution proposed by oppenheim (i.e. rules enjoining one actor to 
distribute a quantifiable benefit or burden to at least two other actors) 
and I will try to show that this third definition does not concern the 
whole category of “rules of distribution” but only a sub-category of “rules 
of distribution in a wider sense” that i will call rules of distribution with 
distributor. Moreover, firstly (§ 2.1.), I will point out the difference between 
two sub-categories of “rules of distribution”: (i) rules of distribution with 
distributor (ii) rule of distribution without distributor. Then (§ 2.2.), I 
will show the relevance of the distinction between rules of distribution 
with distributor and rules of distribution without distributor for the 
comprehension of the concept of distribution.
2.0. Oppenheim affirms that rules of distribution can concern different 
distributive units (for instance: votes, taxes, admissions to college, military 
services, money).
despite this fact, independently of their objects, according to oppenheim’s 
second definition of rules of distribution, rules of distribution are always 
characterised by three elements:
(i) a benefit or a burden to be allotted;
(ii) a reference group; that is, a class of persons to whom the rule is meant 
to apply, usually defined by a common characteristic (e.g., being a 
citizen);
(iii) a selected group; that is, a subclass of the reference group to whom 
the benefit or burden is to be allocated (e.g., all citizens of a certain age).
according to the second definition of rule of distribution, every rule 
characterised by these three elements ((i) benefit or burden, (ii) reference 
group and (iii) selected group) is a rule of distribution. in this sense the 
following five rules can all be considered rules of distribution:
3 (Oppenheim 1981, 96).
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(i) considering all the employees of company c (reference group); 
a benefit of x euros is to be allocated to the employees having 
characteristic y (selected group);
(ii) considering all the citizens (reference group); one vote is to be 
allotted to all citizens of a certain age (selected group);
(iii) considering all the high school graduate students (reference group); 
the admission to college y is allowed to all students that pass the 
college admission test (selected group);
(iv) concerning all citizens (reference group), all men that become of 
legal age (selected group) have to perform military service;
(v) considering all the citizens (reference group); all citizens in the x 
income bracket (selected group) have to pay taxes.
2.1. despite the fact that all the rules (that i just listed) can be considered 
“rules of distribution” (according the second definition of rule of 
distribution proposed by oppenheim), not all these rules are “enjoining 
one actor to distribute a quantifiable benefit or burden”. The list of rules 
of distribution that I have proposed seems to be quite heterogeneous for 
several reasons.
In my opinion, the main difference between these five rules of distribution 
concerns the “distributor” (the person or institution who performs the 
distribution). in fact, in order to make evident the heterogeneity of these 
five examples of rules it is sufficient to answer the following question:
Who is the distributor to whom the injunction is directed?
2.1.1. Let’s first examine rule (i):
(i) considering all the employees of the company (reference group); 
a benefit (for example, a bonus of x euros) is to be allocated to the 
employees having characteristic y (selected group).
rule (i) can be considered a rule of distribution “with distributor”. in fact, in 
this case, the agent (who has to perform the distribution) is the employer4.
2.1.2. Rule (i) is quite different from the rule (ii) on the “distribution” of the 
right to vote:
4 The difference between rules of distribution with distributor and rules of distribution without 
distributor is in part due to the different ontological status of the entities that could be considered as 
“distributive units”. normally in order to distribute juridical entities (powers, rights) no distributor is 
needed, on the other hand in order to distribute material entities it is necessary to enlist a distributor.
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(ii) considering all the citizens (reference group); one vote is to be 
allotted to all citizens aged x years or older (selected group).
In this case it is impossible to find out who (according to the rule) has to 
“distribute votes” because rule (ii) does not oblige anybody to distribute 
votes (or rights to vote) 5.
nevertheless, there is a distribution: in fact, according to rule (i), a selected 
group receives the right to vote, but the ascription of this right does not 
require any further action but the promulgation of rule (ii), so that the 
rule itself is a sufficient condition of the ascription of a voting right. In this 
instance the “rule-giver” and the “distributor” are “the same agent”. 
2.2. Both “distribution with distributor” and “distribution without distributor” 
should be kept conceptually apart from the act of throwing something 
randomly to a group of people.
for instance, let’s imagine an old man who meets a group of wild and potentially 
violent children in a park. if the old man throws randomly some candies to the 
children (in order to preempt their assault), his behaviour is not distribution, 
because his behaviour is not “rule-governed” by any rule of distribution. in fact, 
he will be just throwing something randomly to some people.
The phenomena of distribution can be considered as an effect of the rule 
of distribution (with distributor or without distributor). despite this fact, 
different kinds of rule of distribution (rule of distribution with distributor and 
rule of distribution without distributor) have different effects.
actually, there are (at least) two different types of distribution: i shall call 
the first type distribution without distributor and the second type distribution 
with distributor.
5 The distinction between rule of distribution with distributor and rule of distribution 
without distributor is very similar to the one between hypothetic-deontic rules and thetic-
deontic rules, This distinction is adopted by luigi ferrajoli in order to point out the difference 
between fundamental rights and patrimonial rights. according to ferrajoli: 
“i diritti patrimoniali […] non sono già (conferiti direttamente da) norme, bensì essi suppongono norme, ossia 
norme ipotetico-deontiche che ipoteticamente li predispongono per effetto di atti da esse previsti come loro 
titoli” 
“Patrimonial rights are not (directly conferred) by norms, however they presuppose norms, i.e. a 
hypothetic-deontic norm that hypothetically pre-establishes them as a result of an act provided 
for in the norm”.
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in distribution without distributor no actor has to distribute benefits or 
burdens, so that the distribution is a direct effect6 of a distributive rule (that is a 
constitutive distributive rule)7.
on the other hand, in the distribution with distributor (according to the rule of 
distribution) an actor has to distribute benefits or burdens. Consequently, 
in this case, distribution is the fulfilment of a prescriptive rule that obligates 
someone to distribute benefits or burdens. 
3.0. In § 2.2. I have pointed out that thanks to rules of distribution, it is 
possible to understand distribution as something different from “randomly 
throwing something to somebody”. in other words, the behaviour of the 
distributor acquires its meaning8 in virtue of the distributive rule, so that it 
is not perceivable as random behaviour9.
In the present § 3. I will show that the concept of “distribution” is not fully 
understandable on the basis of rules of distribution. more precisely, i will 
show that not only the concept of “rule of distribution” but also the concept 
of “egalitarianism” is a necessary condition for understanding distribution. 
3.1. according to oppenheim, egalitarianism is a descriptive concept that 
refers to peculiar characteristics of rules of distribution so that it has 
to be kept conceptually apart from the normative concept of “equality”. 
according to oppenheim “egalitarianism” is a “criterion which permits us to 
classify any actual or conceivable rule of distribution as egalitarian (or not 
egalitarian), independently of any evaluative or normative consideration”10.
6 See the concept of “enactment” [“Bestimmung”] in Adolf Reinach (1913 (Eng. trans. 1983)). 
7 Gaetano Carcaterra (2012, 102) affirms that:
“le situazioni e i fatti costituiti [...] si producono in maniera immediata, sono destinati a diventare realtà 
mercè un unico atto, quello [...] col quale si emana la norma”
“constituted states of affairs and constituted facts [effects of a constitutive rule][...] are produced 
immediately [by the rule], they are bound to become real through a unique act, the act [...] 
through which the rule is promulgated”.
according to giuseppe lorini (2000, 230), two sub-categories can be distinguished into the 
category of constitutive rules (as described by carcaterra): (i) institutive rules; (ii) ascriptive rules. 
institutive rules are rules that create new entities in normative reality. for instance the rule (that 
can be found in the canadian department of the environment act) “There is hereby established 
a department of the government of canada called the department of the environment” 
is an institutive rule. on the other hand, constitutive rules of distribution on suffrage are 
ascriptive rules, because they presuppose both the object of distribution and the recipient of the 
distribution. according to lorini constitutive rules of this kind have the form “this is yours”.
8 The behaviour of the distributor gets its normative meaning from the rule of distribution. in 
this sense, even if the rule of distribution (with distributor) is a prescriptive rule, it is possible to 
speak about constitutive force of prescriptive rules. about constitutive force of prescriptive rules 
see Żełaniec (2012, 93-102) and Żełaniec (2013).
9 Hans Kelsen (1967, 4) considers the norm as a scheme of interpretation of the act. According 
to Kelsen “The norm confers legal meaning to the act, so that it may be interpreted according to 
this norm”.
10 (Oppenheim 1970, 144).
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3.1.1. in the essay egalitarianism as a descriptive Concept (1970) Oppenheim 
affirms that:
“We must distinguish. “Equality” can be predicated either of certain 
characteristics of persons, or of distributions made by one actor to at least 
two others, or of rules stipulating how such distributions are to be made. 
“Equality” in the first two meanings presents no problem from the point 
of view of our topic, and we shall be mainly concerned with equality as a 
property of rules of distribution”11.
in contrast to oppenheim’s thesis, i think that it is not always so easy to 
separate egalitarianism “as a quality of rules” from egalitarianism “as a quality 
of acts”. in fact, in “distribution without distributor” the promulgation 
of the rule of distribution and the act of distribution are the same 
phenomenon, so that it is impossible to distinguish the qualities of the act 
(of distribution) from the quality of the rule of distribution.
The phenomenon of “distribution without distributor” is understandable as 
distribution not because of (another) rule of distribution but because of the 
concept of “egalitarianism”.
3.1.2. Oppenheim affirms that “egalitarianism” is a descriptive concept that 
can “qualify rules of distribution”. More precisely, according to Oppenheim 
rules of distribution can be distinguished from the other rules, because 
rules of distribution can be considered egalitarian or in-egalitarian. as 
stated by Oppenheim (1981, 96):
“‘egalitarian’ and ‘in-egalitarian’, like ‘just’ and ‘unjust’, can be predicated 
only of rules of a particular type, which we may call rules of distribution. 
one may ask whether it is morally right or wrong to legalize or to outlaw 
divorce or abortion, but not whether such laws are egalitarian or in-
egalitarian”12.
3.2. oppenheim proposes several formal criteria for determining if a rule 
of distribution is more egalitarian than another rule of distribution. in this 
sense, Oppenheim affirms:
“With respect to a given reference group, a rule of distribution of fixed 
11 (Oppenheim 1970, 144).
12 (Oppenheim 1981, 96).
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benefits or burdens is the more egalitarian, the greater the ratio of the 
selected group to the reference group”13.
3.2.1. according to oppenheim, the descriptive concept of “egalitarianism” 
is the condition for the formulation of the factual judgements that a 
particular rule of distribution is more (or less) egalitarian than another. 
These judgements could be formulated independently from any other moral 
consideration about norm’s content. in this sense oppenheim writes:
“The most egalitarian rules would then be those that treat all members of 
the reference group the same way and that do not select any subgroup for 
different treatment. in other words, if either the selected or the excluded 
group is the same as the reference group, the rule is fully egalitarian 
(strictly speaking, there is then no selected group”): universal suffrage as 
well as total absence of elections; universal military training as well as an 
all-volunteer army (nobody must serve)”14.
criteria which are expressly laid down by oppenheim are useful in order to 
know if a rule of distribution is factually more (or less) egalitarian than another.
3.2.2. in my opinion, the concept of “egalitarianism” as conceived by 
oppenheim is not only a criterion for judging a distributive rule but it is 
also a necessary condition for the formulation of distributive rules. in 
other words, it is impossible to formulate a rule of distribution without 
presupposing the concept of “egalitarianism” because it would be impossible 
either to define the reference group or to select the group that will get the 
benefit or the burden.
for example, in order to formulate the norm on suffrage it is necessary to 
determine a reference group and a selected group. in other words, both 
the choice of the “reference group” and the choice of the “selected group” 
presuppose a concept of “egalitarianism”.
in addition, without presupposing the concept of “egalitarianism” it 
would be impossible to understand a rule as a “rule of distribution” and, 
consequently, its effect as a distribution15.
13 (oppenheim 1981, 99).
14 (oppenheim 1981, 98).
15  This is especially evident in the case of distribution without distributor. for instance, i have 
shown (in § 2) that the distribution is a direct effect of norms on suffrage (because they are 
constitutive rule), so that the act of promulgation of the rule and the act of distribution can be 
perceived as the same act.
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for example, norms on suffrage could be described as rules of obligation16 (if we 
see voting as a duty) or as a power-conferring rule (if we see voting as a right)17: 
but the concept of “egalitarianism” allows us to perceive the rule on suffrage as a 
rule of distribution, so that it is possible to understand its “distributive import”18.
3.3. since the concept of “egalitarianism” is a necessary condition for 
understanding both the sense of the rule of distribution and the sense of 
the act of distribution, it (“egalitarianism”) can be described as a meta-
institutional concept of distribution. as stated by giuseppe lorini:
“meta-institutional concepts do not have in the institutions their own 
conditions of possibility, on the other hand, they constitute the conditions 
of possibility of certain institutions”19.
Two vivid examples of meta-institutional concepts are the concepts of 
“victory” and the concept of “defeat”. as stated by lorini:
“The meaning of ‘victory’ and the meaning of ‘defeat’ in the sphere of an 
institution seem go beyond the boundaries of the single institution. The 
institutions determine the conditions of victory and defeat, and then the 
extension of the words ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ in the sphere of an institution 
like chess or soccer. But the intension of the two words is not determined 
by the institutions that determine the conditions of victory and defeat. 
Victory and defeat seem not to be institutional concepts, but rather meta-
institutional concepts [...] they do not have in the institutions their own 
conditions of possibility, but on the contrary, they constitute the conditions 
of possibility of certain institutions like competitive games”20.
The same conclusions can be reached by analysing the meta-institutional 
concept of “game”, according to lorini:
“The concept of game is a (necessary) condition of possibility of both the 
activity of playing chess (an institutional fact) and the game of chess (an 
institution)”21.
16 See Carcaterra (2011, 90).
17 Oddly, the art. 62. 3 of the Belgian constitution [la Constitution Belge] can be found under Title 
iii. on powers [Titre iii. des Pouvoirs]. despite this fact, it legislates: “Voting is obligatory ” [“le vote 
est obligatoire”].
18 Conte (2007, 30) considers the “act (the “deontic statement” [“enunciazione deontica”]) one of 
the five possible referents of the term ‘norm’.
19 (Lorini 2012, 143)
20 (Lorini 2012, 143).
21  (Lorini 2013, in press).
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i would add that without the meta-institutional concept of “game” not only 
a move in chess would not be conceived as the move of a game, but also the 
rules of chess would not be conceived as the rules of a game.
similarly, “egalitarianism” is a kind of meta-institutional concept because 
both rule of distribution and act of distribution cannot be understood in 
abstraction from the concept of “egalitarianism”.
4.0. in the previous paragraphs i showed that both rules of distribution and 
the concept of “egalitarianism” are necessary conditions for understanding 
and for performing the act of distribution.
4.1. Oppenheim affirms (correctly, I should say) that we can decide if a 
distributive rule is more or less egalitarian than another only on the basis 
of formal descriptive criteria. despite this fact, we cannot prefer a rule of 
distribution to another on the basis of formal descriptive criteria (the ratio 
of the selected to the reference group).
in fact, in order to choose consciously between two or more rules of 
distribution we need to adopt a value judgement on the content of that rule. 
This value’s judgement is in any case not reducible to a ratio, because it 
concerns the ethical content of the norm and is the necessary basis for that 
relation that oppenheim calls “egalitarianism”22.
in order to formulate a rule of distribution it is necessary to adopt 
some ethical judgements. more precisely, in order to formulate a rule of 
distribution it is necessary to adopt value judgements concerning three 
elements that (according to Oppenheim (see § 1.2.)) “always are specified 
either explicitly or implicitly) by the rules of distribution” i.e. (i) a benefit or 
a burden to be allotted; (ii) a reference group and (iii) a selected group.
ethical judgements allow us to choose which the relevant characteristics 
for defining reference group and selected group are. In fact, every rule of 
distribution hides a value judgement, because every rule implicitly qualifies 
the “distributive unit” (what is to be distributed) as a benefit or as a burden. 
Moreover, ethical judgements allow us to define the “distributive unit” (that 
which is to be distributed) and (more precisely) to define “distributive units” 
as a benefit or as a burden, since “distributive units” are never value-free.
every rule of distribution presupposes these ethical judgements, that are 
necessary conditions for the formulation of the rule. such judgements allow 
us to perceive a distribution as a burden’s distribution or as a benefit’s 
distribution, but also as a just or an unjust distribution.
22 Cf. (Scheler 1916, 249 (Eng. tr. 242)).
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4.2. Rules of distribution can be formulated for the fulfilment of different 
values (not necessarily the value of “equality”), despite this fact, the same 
rule analysed from different value’s perspective can appear radically 
different. for example, curiously, rule on suffrage can be perceived as a rule 
of distribution of powers or as a rule of distribution of burden. in this sense, 
values can represent also a peculiar point of view that allows us to perceive 
on one hand selected aspects of rules and the peculiar ethical meaning of 
“rule-governed practices of distribution” on the other.
Thus, values can represent a peculiar point of view that allows us to perceive 
on one hand selected aspects of rules of distribution and, on the other hand, 
the peculiar ethical meaning of the (rule-governed) practice of distribution.
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